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Abstract
The Fiat-Shamir transform is a well studied paradigm for removing interaction from public-
coin protocols. We investigate whether the resulting non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK)
proof systems also exhibit non-malleability properties that have up to now only been studied
for NIZK proof systems in the common reference string model: first, we formally define
simulation soundness and a weak form of simulation extraction in the random oracle model
(ROM). Second, we show that in the ROM the Fiat-Shamir transform meets these properties
under lenient conditions. A consequence of our result is that, in the ROM, we obtain
truly efficient non malleable NIZK proof systems essentially for free. Our definitions are
sufficient for instantiating the Naor-Yung paradigm for CCA2-secure encryption, as well as
a generic construction for signature schemes from hard relations and simulation-extractable
NIZK proof systems. These two constructions are interesting as the former preserves both
the leakage resilience and key-dependent message security of the underlying CPA-secure
encryption scheme, while the latter lifts the leakage resilience of the hard relation to the
leakage resilience of the resulting signature scheme.
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1 Introduction
Zero-knowledge proof systems [27] are a powerful tool for designing cryptographic primitives
and protocols. They force malicious parties to behave according to specification while allow-
ing honest parties to protect their secrets. Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [11]
consist of a single proof message passed from the prover to the verifier. They are particularly
useful for designing public-key encryption and signature schemes as the proof can be added to
the ciphertext and signature respectively. Understanding the most efficient NIZK proofs that
are sufficiently strong, i.e., sufficiently non-malleable, for building signature and encryption
schemes with strong security properties is thus of fundamental importance in cryptography. It
was shown by Goldreich and Oren [26] that NIZK proofs are unattainable in the standard model.
To avoid this impossibility result, one must rely on additional assumptions, such as common
reference strings [10] (CRS model) or idealizations of hash functions [8] (random oracle model,
ROM).
With the aim of finding the “right” definition in the non-interactive case, several flavors
of non-malleability [20] have been introduced for NIZK in the CRS model [39, 40, 25, 32].
The notion of simulation soundness, which bridges soundness and zero knowledge, guarantees
that soundness holds even after seeing accepting proofs, for both true and false statements,
produced by the simulator. This strengthened soundness notion was first proposed by Sahai
in [39], and later improved by De Santis et al. [40]. The notion of simulation extraction [40, 29]
in addition requires that accepting proofs allow to extract witnesses. Different variants of
simulation extraction have been proposed by [16, 19].
Until recently, zero-knowledge in general and NIZK in particular were considered to be
primarily of theoretical interest. Significant exceptions being efficient Σ-protocols [17, 18] and
their non-interactive relatives based on the Fiat-Shamir (FS) transform [22]. A Σ-protocol
is a three-move interactive scheme where the prover sends the first message and the verifier
sends a random challenge as the second message. In a nutshell, the Fiat-Shamir transform
removes the interaction by computing the challenge as the hash value of the first message and
the theorem that is being proven. Σ-protocols and the Fiat-Shamir transform are widely used
in the construction of efficient identification [22], anonymous credential [15], signature [37, 1],
e-voting schemes [9], and many other cryptographic constructions [12, 6, 24].
Most work on the provable security of zero-knowledge has, however, been conducted either on
interactive proof systems in the plain model or on NIZK in the CRS model, while practitioners
often preferred Fiat-Shamir based NIZK proofs for their simplicity and efficiency. The use of the
Fiat-Shamir transform was most thoroughly explored in the security proofs of signature schemes
in the random oracle model [37, 1], but was otherwise often used heuristically. The question
thus arises whether one can lay sound foundations for the FS transform in the light of recent
research on CRS-based NIZKs. To this end, we provide non-malleability definitions for NIZK
in the random oracle model that closely follow the established CRS-based definitions [29]. An
earlier result oriented in the same direction, but concerning a Σ-protocol for a specific language,1
was given by Fouque and Pointcheval [24]. Their proof strategy relies on the forking lemma [37]
and (implicitly) on the fact that the Σ-protocol they consider has a particular property called
strong special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SS-HVZK). Since there exist Σ-protocols that
do not satisfy the SS-HVZK property, Fouque and Pointcheval’s proof cannot be immediately
extended to the general case. Moreover, we make the random oracle explicit in our definition,
which is crucial as definitions in the random oracle model can be brittle [42].
Our first observation is that much less is required to show simulation soundness for any FS-
NIZK proof. Namely, in the random oracle model, simulation soundness simply follows from
1This is the language used in the Naor-Yung transform when the underlying encryption is the ElGamal scheme.
3
the soundness and the HVZK properties of the underlying interactive protocol. In particular,
it is neither necessary to rely on the forking lemma, nor on the strong 2 property of SS-HVZK.
We also show that the proof strategy of [24], when generalized properly to any Σ-protocol,
yields something more than just simulation soundness. In fact, one gets some form of simula-
tion extractability, which we call weak simulation extractability. In a nutshell, full simulation
extractability requires that even after seeing many simulated proofs, whenever an adversary
outputs a new accepted proof, we can build an algorithm to extract a valid witness. Sometimes,
such a strong extraction property is called online extraction [23] because the extractor outputs
a witness directly after receiving the adversary’s proof. In comparison, our notion is weaker in
that it allows the extractor to fully control the adversary (i.e., rewind it).
Our contribution. Our contributions are threefold. First, we formally define the notions
of zero-knowledge (which holds trivially for the Fiat-Shamir transform), simulation soundness,
and simulation extractability for NIZKs in the random oracle model. Second, we show that
simulation soundness and a weak form of simulation extractability come for free if one uses the
FS-transform for turning Σ-protocols into NIZK proof systems. Third, we investigate the con-
sequences of this result by showing that our definitions are sufficient for instantiating the Naor-
Yung paradigm for constructing CCA2-secure encryption schemes, and generic construction
for signature schemes from hard relations and simulation-extractable NIZK proof systems [19].
These two constructions are particularly interesting as the former preserves both leakage re-
silience and key-dependent message security of the underlying CPA-secure encryption scheme,
while the latter lifts the leakage resilience of the hard relation to the leakage resilience of the
resulting signature scheme. To our knowledge, these are the most efficient schemes having such
properties, if one is willing to rely on the ROM.3
Related work. The only other efficient transform for Σ-protocols yielding simulation sound-
ness (again in the random oracle model) is Fischlin’s transform [23] which is designed with
the purpose of online extraction and is less efficient than the classical Fiat-Shamir transform.
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate whether Fischlin’s transform achieves a stronger
form of simulation extractability. We notice that in the interactive case, a general transform
from any Σ-protocol to an (unbounded) simulation-sound Σ-protocol using one-time signatures
has been proposed [25]. In the common reference string model the most efficient simulation-
sound or simulation extractable NIZK proof system are based on Groth-Sahai proofs [30]. One
has however to pay the price of proving a structure-preserving CCA secure encryption [19] (for
true-simulation extraction) or a structure-preserving signature scheme [3] (for full simulation
extraction).
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Let k be a security parameter. A function ν is called negligible if ν(k) ≤ k−c for
any c > 0 and sufficiently large k. Given two functions f, g, we write f ≈ g if there exists a
negligible function ν such that |f(k) − g(k)| < ν(k). Given an algorithm A, y ← A(x) means
that y is the output of A on input x; when A is randomized, then y is a random variable. We
write AH to denote the fact that A has oracle access to some function H. PPT stands for
2In Appendix B, we show a separation between the two notions of special HVZK [17] (S-HVZK) and
SS-HVZK, by showing that any S-HVZK Σ-protocol can be turned into another Σ-protocol which is still
S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK, assuming that one-way functions exist.
3In particular we obtain as a special case the Alwen et al. [4] leakage-resilient signature scheme based on the
Okamoto identification scheme.
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Prover P(x,w; 1k) Verifier V(x; 1k)
α← P0(x,w; ρ) α−→
β←− β $← V0(x, α)
γ ← P1(α, β, x, w; ρ) γ−→ Accept iff V1(x, α, β, γ) = 1
Figure 1: A Σ-protocol for a language L.
probabilistic-polynomial time. A decision problem related to a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ consists
in determining whether a string x is in L or not. Given an instance x, we say that A decides
(or recognizes) L if, after a finite number of steps, the algorithm halts and outputs A(x) = 1
if x ∈ L, otherwise A(x) = 0. (Sometimes, we may call “theorem” a string belonging to the
language at hand.) We can associate to any NP-language L a polynomial-time recognizable
relation RL defining L itself, that is L = {x : ∃w s.t. (x,w) ∈ RL}, where |w| ≤ poly(|x|). The
string w is called a witness or certificate for membership of x ∈ L. For NP, w corresponds to
the non-deterministic choices made by A.
Interactive protocols. An interactive proof system (IPS) for membership in L is a two-party
protocol, where a prover wants to convince an efficient verifier that a string x belongs to L. In a
zero-knowledge interactive proof system, a prover P can convince a verifier V that x ∈ L without
revealing anything beyond the fact that the statement is indeed true. Informally, this means
that V cannot exploit the interaction with P for gaining extra-knowledge. Such a property is
formalized by requiring the existence of an efficient algorithm S, the zero-knowledge simulator,
which produces messages indistinguishable from conversations between an honest prover P and
a malicious verifier V∗. Besides the zero-knowledge property, any proof system satisfies two
standard requirements: proving true statements is always possible, while it should be infeasible
to convince the verifier to accept a false statement as correct. These two conditions are called
completeness and soundness respectively. Related to the concept of interactive proof systems,
but even more subtle, is the notion of proof of knowledge. In a proof of knowledge (PoK), P
wants to convince V that he knows a secret witness which implies the validity of some assertion,
and not merely that the assertion is true. To formalize the fact that a prover actually “knows
something”, we require that there exists an efficient algorithm E , called knowledge extractor,
that when given complete access to the program of the prover can extract the witness.
An IPS or an interactive PoK is called public-coin when the verifier’s moves consist merely
of tossing coins and sending their outcomes to the prover. (In contrast, in a private-coin IPS
the verifier does not need to show the outcome of the coins to the prover [28].) We are mainly
interested in a specific class of public-coin interactive PoK systems for NP-languages, called Σ-
protocols. Here, the parties involved share a string x belonging to a language L ∈ NP and the
prover also holds a witness w for membership of x ∈ L. Thus, the prover P wants to convince the
verifier V that it “knows” a witness w for x, i.e. that x is in the language, without revealing the
witness itself. Σ-protocols have a 3-move shape where the first message α, called commitment,
is sent by the prover and then, alternatively, the parties exchange the other messages β and γ,
called (respectively) challenge and response. The interaction is depicted in Figure 1. Besides
the standard properties held by any IPS, Σ-protocols satisfy a flavour of zero-knowledge —
called honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK) — saying that an honest verifier taking part in
the protocol does not learn anything beyond the validity of the theorem being proven.
Definition 1 (Σ-protocols). A Σ-protocol Σ = (P,V) for an NP-language L is a three-round
public-coin IPS where P = (P0,P1) and V = (V0,V1) are PPT algorithms, with the following
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additional proprieties:
Completeness. If x ∈ L, any proper execution of the protocol between P and V ends with the
verifier accepting P’s proof.
Honest-verifier zero knowledge (HVZK). There exists an efficient algorithm S, called
zero-knowledge simulator, such that for any PPT distinguisher D = (D0,D1) and for
any (x,w) ∈ RL, the view of the following two experiments, real and simulated, are com-
putationally indistinguishable:
Experiment ExprealΣ,D (1k)
(x,w, δ)← D0(1k)
pi ← 〈P(x,w; 1k),V(x; 1k)〉
Output D1(pi, δ)
Experiment ExpsimΣ,D(S, 1k)
(x,w, δ)← D0(1k)
pi ← S(x, 1k)
Output D1(pi, δ)
where 〈P(x,w),V(x)〉 denotes the verdict returned at the end of the interaction between P
and V on common input x and private input w.
Soundness. If x /∈ L then any malicious (even unbounded) prover P∗ is accepted only with
negligible probability.
Special soundness. There exists an efficient algorithm E, called special extractor, such that
given two accepting conversations (α, β, γ) and (α, β′, γ′) for a string x, where β 6= β′,
then w ← E(α, β, γ, β′, γ′, x) is such that (x,w) ∈ RL.
The special soundness property is strong enough to imply both soundness and that Σ-protocols
are PoK [18]. Sometimes Σ-protocols are required to meet stronger notions of HVZK. 4
A non-standard condition that many Σ-protocols satisfy, introduced by Fischlin in [23],
requires that responses are quasi unique, i.e. given an accepting proof it should be infeasible to
find a new valid response for that proof.
Definition 2 (Quasi unique responses). A Σ-protocol has quasi unique responses if for any
PPT A and for any security parameter k it holds:
Prob[(x, α, β, γ, γ′)← A(1k) : V(x, α, β, γ) = V(x, α, β, γ′) = 1 ∧ γ 6= γ′] ≈ 0.
A Σ-protocol has unique responses if the probability above is zero. The latter condition,
defined by Unruh in [41], is also known as strict soundness.
Min-entropy of commitments. Following [1, 2], we use the concept of min-entropy to
measure how likely it is for a commitment to collide with a fixed value.
Definition 3 (Min-entropy of commitment). Let k be a security parameter and L be an
NP-language with relation RL. Consider a pair (x,w) ∈ RL and let (P,V) be an arbitrary
three-round IPS. Denote with Coins(k) the set of coins used by the prover and consider the
set A(x,w) = {P0(x,w; ρ) : ρ ← Coins(k))} of all possible commitments associated to w. The
min-entropy function associated to (P,V) is defined as ε(k) = min(x,w)(− log2 µ(x,w)),where the
minimum is taken over all possible (x,w) drawn from RL and µ(x,w) is the maximum probability
that a commitment takes on a particular value, i.e., µ(x,w) = maxα∈A(x,w)(Prob[P0(x,w; ρ) =
α : ρ← Coins(k))]).
4We discuss these notions and implications and non implications between them in the Appendix B.
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We say that (P,V) is non-trivial if ε(k) = ω(log(k)) is super-logarithmic in k. Often, the
commitment is drawn uniformly from some set. In order for (P,V) to be non-trivial, this set
must have size exponential in k. Notice that most of natural Σ-protocols meet such a condition
and, in fact, non-triviality is quite easy to achieve, e.g. by appending redundant random bits
to the commitment.
Forking lemma. To prove our second main result, we make use of the following version of
the forking lemma, which appeared in [6].
Lemma 1 (General forking lemma). Fix an integer Q and a set H of size h ≥ 2. Let P be a
randomized program that on input y, h1, . . . , hQ returns a pair, the first element of which is an
integer in the range 0, . . . , Q and the second element of which we refer to as a side output. Let
IG be a randomized algorithm that we call the input generator. The accepting probability of P,
denoted acc, is defined as the probability that J ≥ 1 in the experiment y ← IG;h1, . . . , hQ ←
H; (J, s)← P(y, h1, . . . , hQ).
The forking algorithm FP associated to P is the randomized algorithm that on input y proceeds
as follows.
Algorithm FP(y)
Pick coins ρ for P at random
h1, . . . , hQ ← H
(I, s)← P(y, h1, . . . , hQ; ρ)
If I = 0 return (0,⊥,⊥)
h′I , . . . , h
′
Q ← H
(I ′, s′)← P(y, h1, . . . , hI−1, h′I , . . . , h′Q; ρ)
If (I = I ′) ∧ (hI 6= h′I) return (1, s, s′) else return (0,⊥,⊥)
Let ext = Prob[b = 1 : y ← IG; (b, s, s′)← FP(y)], then ext ≥ acc
(
acc
Q − 1h
)
.
3 Properties of NIZKs in the Random Oracle Model
Removing interaction. The Fiat-Shamir transform was originally designed to turn three-
round identification schemes into efficient signature schemes. As Σ-protocols are an extension of
three-round identification schemes, it is not surprising that they can be considered as a starting
point for the Fiat-Shamir transform. The Fiat-Shamir paradigm applies to any Σ-protocol
(and more generally to any three-round public-coin proof system): We start from an interactive
protocol (P,V) and remove the interaction between P and V by replacing the challenge, chosen
at random by the verifier, with a hash value H(α, x) computed by the prover, where H is a
hash function modeled as a random oracle. Thus, the interactive protocol (P,V) is turned into
a non-interactive one: The resulting protocol, denoted (PH ,VH), is called Fiat-Shamir proof
system.
Throughout this paper, we refer to the so called explicitly programmable random oracle
model [42] (EPROM) where the simulator is allowed to program the random oracle explicitly.
We model this by defining the zero-knowledge simulator S of a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof system as a stateful algorithm that can operate in two modes: (hi, st)← S(1, st, qi) takes
care of answering random oracle queries (usually by lazy sampling) while (pi, st) ← S(2, st, x)
simulates the actual proof. Note that calls to S(1, · · · ) and S(2, · · · ) share the common state
st that is updated after each operation.
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Definition 4 (Unbounded non-interactive zero knowledge). Let L be a language in NP. Denote
with (S1,S2) the oracles such that S1(qi) returns the first output of (hi, st) ← S(1, st, qi) and
S2(x,w) returns the first output of (pi, st) ← S(2, st, x) if (x,w) ∈ RL. We say a protocol
(PH ,VH) is a NIZK proof for language L in the random oracle model, if there exists a PPT
simulator S such that for all PPT distinguishers D we have
Prob[DH(·),PH(·,·)(1k) = 1] ≈ Prob[DS1(·),S2(·,·)(1k) = 1],
where both P and S2 oracles output ⊥ if (x,w) /∈ RL.
A well known fact is that, in the random oracle model, the Fiat-Shamir transform allows to
efficiently design digital signature schemes [22] and non-interactive zero-knowledge protocols.
In fact, an appealing characteristic of this transform is that many properties of the starting
protocol are still valid after applying it. In particular, it has been proven that the Fiat-Shamir
transform turns any three-round public-coin zero-knowledge interactive proof system into a
NIZK proof system [8]. It is straightforward to prove that the same holds when the starting
protocol is ZK only with respect to a honest verifier, as stated in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 (Fiat-Shamir NIZKs). Let k be a security parameter. Consider a non-trivial three-
round public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge interactive proof system (P,V) for a language
L ∈ NP. Let H be a function with range equal to the space of the verifier’s coins. In the
random oracle model the proof system (PH ,VH), derived from (P,V) by applying the Fiat-
Shamir transform, is unbounded non-interactive zero-knowledge.
sketch. To prove that the proof system (PH ,VH) is non-interactive zero-knowledge it is sufficient
to show that there exists a simulator S as required in Definition 4. This can be done by invoking
the HVZK simulator associated with the underlying interactive proof system. In particular, S
works as follows:
• To answer query q = (x, α) to S1, S(1, st, q) lazily samples a lookup table TH kept in state
st. It checks whether TH(q) is already defined. If this is the case, it returns the previously
assigned value; otherwise it returns and sets a fresh random value (of the appropriate
length).
• To answer query x to S2 (respectively S ′2), S(2, st, x) calls the HVZK simulator of (P,V) on
input x to obtain a proof (α, β, γ). Then, it updates TH in such a way that β = TH(x, α).
If TH happens to be already defined on this input, S returns failure and aborts.
We call this simulator canonical. The main result of Fiat-Shamir [22] (expressed for their
particular identification protocol) is that S is a “good” NIZK simulator. The crucial step in the
proof is that the starting protocol (P,V) is non-trivial (cf. Definition 3), thus the probability of
failure in each of the queries to S ′2 is upper-bounded by Prob[failure] ≤ 2−ε(k), which is negligible
in k.
Simulation soundness. The soundness property of a proof system ensures that no malicious
prover can come up with an accepting proof for a string that does not belong to the language
in question (i.e., for a false theorem). However, it is not clear whether this condition still holds
after the attacker observes valid proofs for adaptively chosen (true or false) statements. The
notion of simulation soundness deals with this case.
Definition 5 (Unbounded simulation soundness). Let L be a language in NP. Consider a proof
system (PH ,VH) for L, with zero-knowledge simulator S. Denote with (S1,S ′2) the oracles such
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that S1(qi) returns the first output of (hi, st)← S(1, st, qi) and S ′2(x) returns the first output of
(pi, st)← S(2, st, x). We say that (PH ,VH) is simulation sound with respect to S in the random
oracle model, if for all PPT adversaries A the following holds:
Prob[(x?, pi?)← AS1(·),S′2(·) : (x?, pi?) /∈ T ∧ x? /∈ L ∧ VS1(x?, pi?) = 1] ≈ 0,
where T is the list of pairs (xi, pii), i.e., respectively queries asked to and proofs returned by the
simulator.
We stress that the above definition relies crucially on the zero-knowledge property of (PH ,VH),
as we use a probability experiment that defines a property of S to define a property about
(PH ,VH). In particular the definition is most meaningful for a simulator S for which the sim-
ulation of the random oracle of S1 is consistent with a truly random oracle H. Also note that
S ′2 allows A to ask for simulated proofs of false statements.
The possibility to request proofs of false statements has an interesting consequence: simu-
lation soundness holds only with respect to specific simulators and not in general for all NIZK
simulators. In particular, one can construct a NIZK proof system (PH ,VH) that is simulation
sound with respect to a simulator S but for which there exists a valid NIZK simulator Sˆ, such
that (PH ,VH) cannot be simulation sound with respect to Sˆ. To see this, consider a VH that
accepts all proofs if H(0) = 0. Sˆ simulates a consistent random oracle until it receives a proof
of a false statement (one of which could be hard-coded in Sˆ or easy to recognize) at which point
it sets TH(0) = 0. Note that a similar counterexample exists for CRS-based NIZK [29]: Sˆ2 can
simply return the simulation trapdoor when queried on a false statement.
Simulation extractability. Combining simulation soundness and knowledge extraction, we
may require that even after seeing (polynomially) many simulated proofs, whenever A makes a
new proof it is possible to extract a witness. This property is called simulation extractability,
and implies simulation soundness. Indeed, if we can extract a witness from the adversary’s
proof even with small probability, then obviously the statement must belong to the language
in question. We introduce a weaker flavor of simulation extractability which we call weak
simulation extractability. The main difference with full simulation extractability is that the
extractor EA is now given complete control over the adversary A, meaning that it is allowed to
rewind A and gets to see the answers of (S1,S ′2). Moreover, we require that if A outputs an
accepting proof with some probability, then EA can extract with almost the same probability.
Definition 6 (Weak simulation extractability). Let L be a language in NP. Consider a NIZK
proof system (PH ,VH) for L with zero-knowledge simulator S. Let (S1,S ′2) be oracles returning
the first output of (hi, st) ← S(1, st, qi) and (pi, st) ← S(2, st, x) respectively. We say that
(PH ,VH) is weakly simulation-extractable with extraction error ν and with respect to S in the
random oracle model, if for all PPT adversaries A there exists an efficient algorithm EA with
access to the answers TH , T of (S1,S ′2) respectively such that the following holds. Let:
acc = Prob
[
(x?, pi?)← AS1(·),S′2(·)(1k; ρ) : (x?, pi?) 6∈ T ;VS1(x?, pi?) = 1]
ext = Prob
[
(x?, pi?)← AS1(·),S′2(·)(1k; ρ);
w? ← EA(x?, pi?; ρ, TH , T ) : (x?, pi?) 6∈ T ; (x?, w?) ∈ RL
]
,
where the probability space in both cases is over the random choices of S and the adversary’s
random tape ρ. Then, there exist a constant d > 0 and a polynomial p such that whenever
acc ≥ ν, we have ext ≥ 1p(acc− ν)d.
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The above definition is inspired by similar notions in the context of proofs of knowledge [5, 31,
41]. The value ν is called extraction error of the proof system. We omit for better readability
that values acc, ext, p, ν all depend on the security parameter k. Note that a non-negligible
extractor error can be made exponentially small by sequential repetitions (see Appendix C for
a proof).
Proposition 1 (Extraction error amplification). Let (PH ,VH) be a weakly simulation ex-
tractable NIZK proof system with extraction error ν. Then, the proof system (P ′H ,V ′H) ob-
tained by repeating sequentially (PH ,VH) for a number n of times yields a weakly simulation
extractable NIZK proof system with extraction error νn.
It is useful to look at the relation between weak simulation extractability and the following
stronger property modeling online-extraction.
Definition 7 (Full Simulation extractability). Let L be a language in NP. Consider a NIZK
proof system (PH ,VH) for L with simulator S. Let (S1,S ′2) be oracles returning the first output
of (hi, st)← S(1, st, qi) and (pi, st)← S(2, st, x) respectively. We say that (PH ,VH) is strongly
simulation extractable with respect to S in the random oracle model, if there exists an efficient
algorithm E such that for all PPT adversaries A the following holds. Let:
Prob
[
w? ← E(st, x?, pi?) : (x?, pi?)← AS1(·),S′2(·)(1k; ρ);
(x?, pi?) 6∈ T ; VS1(x?, pi?) = 1; (x?, w?) /∈ RL
] ≈ 0
where T is the list of transcripts (xi, pii) returned by the simulator and the probability space is
over the random choices of S and the adversary’s randomness ρ.
Note that both our unbounded simulation soundness and our full simulation extractability
definitions can be instantiated by common reference string based schemes. H turns into a
random constant function that always returns the reference string, and the state st consists of
the simulation and extraction trapdoors.
4 On the Non-malleability of the Fiat-Shamir Transform
4.1 Simulation Soundness
We now show that NIZK proofs obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from any IPS of the
public-coin type additionally satisfying the HVZK property are simulation sound. Since Σ-
protocols are a special class of HVZK public-coin IPSs, we get as a corollary that Fiat-Shamir
NIZK proofs obtained from Σ-protocols are simulation-sound.
Theorem 2 (Simulation soundness of the Fiat-Shamir transform). Consider a non-trivial three-
round public-coin HVZK interactive proof system (P,V) for a language L ∈ NP, with quasi
unique responses. In the random oracle model, the proof system (PH ,VH) derived from (P,V)
via the Fiat-Shamir transform is a simulation-sound NIZK with respect to its canonical simu-
lator S.
Proof. We assume that (PH ,VH) is a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system with the sim-
ulator S described in the proof of Theorem 1, and show that (PH ,VH) is simulation sound. We
proceed by contradiction. Suppose there exists a PPT adversary A that breaks the simulation
soundness of the non-interactive protocol with non-negligible probability
 := Prob
[
(x?, pi?)← AS1(·),S′2(·) : (x?, pi?) /∈ T ∧ x? /∈ L ∧ VS1(x?, pi?) = 1].
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In such a case, we are able to build two reductions Pˆ and P∗ which, by using A as a black-box,
violate either the quasi unique response or the soundness properties of the underlying interactive
protocol (P,V) respectively, contradicting our hypothesis. Recall that S1 simulates answers to
the RO, while S ′2 replies with an accepting proof pi. Without loss of generality we assume that
whenever adversary A succeeds and outputs an accepting proof (α?, γ?), she has previously
queried the oracle S1 on input (x?, α?). The argument for this is that it is straightforward to
transform any adversary that violates this condition into an adversary that makes one additional
query to S1 and wins with the same probability.
A simple but crucial observation is that adversary A may have learned α? by querying the
oracle S ′2 on input x? or might have computed it itself. We denote the first by the event proof,
the second by the event proof. As these events are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, we have:
Prob[A wins] = Prob[A wins ∧ proof] + Prob[A wins ∧ proof].
Now we have two different cases to analyze, each of them corresponding to the probability in
the expression above.
In the first case (when proof happens), we assume that x? is asked to S ′2 and the answer
is a proof of the type (α?,−). We show how to use an adversary A that makes use of (x?, α?)
in its fake proof to build a reduction Pˆ. In this way we bound Prob[A wins ∧ proof] by the
probability that Pˆ wins in breaking the quasi unique response property. First, observe that if A
wins with a proof (α?,−) and makes the query x? to S′2, she implicitly has to set also the value
S1(x?, α?) := β such that H(α?, x?) = β. This forces her to use such values for producing a
proof x?, pi?. Thus, the fake proof she outputs must be of the type pi? = (α?,−) for x? such that
H(x?, α?) = β. On the other hand, such a proof cannot be the same returned by the simulator,
since a forgery cannot appear in the list T . This means that a fake proof for x? produced by
A must have the first argument equal to α?, gives by the simulator S ′2. But as the proof of A
is accepted the responses must be different, and so Pˆ must be successful in breaking the quasi
unique response property. This intuition can be formalized by giving an explicit reduction from
A to Pˆ.
Consider an algorithm Pˆ which runs A internally as a black-box. Thus, Pˆ sees all queries
A makes to the oracles S1 and S ′2 and produces their answers. The internal description of Pˆ
follows:
• Pˆ answers S1 and S ′2 and keeps lists TH and T respectively as the real simulator S would.
• When A outputs a fake proof (α?, γ?) for x?, Pˆ looks through its lists T and TH until it
finds (x?, (α?, γ)) and ((x?, α?), β) respectively;
• It returns (x?, α?, β, γ?, γ).
We claim that algorithm Pˆ breaks the quasi unique response property. Indeed, the proof
produced by A is accepting by VH on common input x?. On the other hand, the proof
(α?, γ) is given by the simulator, therefore it must be accepting for x?. Given this, it holds
VH(x?, α?, γ?) = VH(x?, α?, γ) = 1, that means
V(x?, α?, H(x?, α?), γ?) = V(x?, α?, H(x?, α?), γ) = 1,
where H(x?, α?) = β. The conclusion is that either γ = γ?, that is excluded since A cannot win
by printing a simulated proof, or algorithm Pˆ succeeds in breaking the quasi unique response
property. We obtain:
Prob[A wins ∧ proof] = Prob[Pˆ wins] ≤ negl(k).
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In case proof does not happen, we can use adversary A that does not query S ′2 with input x?
to build a reduction P∗ and bound Prob[A wins ∧ proof] by the probability Prob[P∗ wins] ·Q of
breaking the soundness of the underlying interactive scheme. P∗ runs A as a black-box and has
to simulate its environment by answering the queries to S1 and S ′2 in a consistent way. More
precisely, P∗ works as follows. It guesses uniformly at random an index j ∈ [Q] and replies to
queries to S1 and S ′2 in the following way:
1. Answer query (xi, αi) to S1:
(a) Query 1 ≤ i ≤ j − 1: Returns H(xi, αi) if it is already defined; otherwise it samples
a random value βi and sets H(xi, αi) := βi.
(b) Query j: Runs the protocol with the honest verifier V for statement xj , using as a
commitment the value αj . Obtains challenge βj from V and program the oracle as
H(xj , αj) := βj . The answer to A’s query is βj .
(c) Query j + 1 ≤ i ≤ Q: Proceed as in Step 1a.
2. Answer query x to S ′2: Run the HVZK simulator of the interactive protocol on input
x to obtain an accepting proof (α, β, γ), and program the oracle H in such a way that
H(x, α) := β. If the NIZK simulator returns failure, which happens when H(x, α) is
already defined, output failure and abort, otherwise output (α, γ).
3. Answer V’s challenge: Let x?, (α?, γ?) be the instance and the proof output by A. Return
γ? to V as the response to challenge βj in step 1b.
We need to estimate the probability that P∗ succeeds in breaking the soundness of the interactive
scheme (P,V) in terms of the probability that A outputs an accepting proof (α?, γ?) for a false
statement x?. Suppose that (x?, α?) has been asked to the random oracle as the j?-th query
and we have j = j?, i.e., P∗ guesses the correct index for which A outputs an accepting proof
for a false statement x?. In such a case, P∗ breaks the soundness of (P,V). Hence, we get:
Prob[P∗ wins] = Prob[A wins ∧ j = j? ∧ proof]
= Prob[A wins ∧ proof] · Prob[j = j?],
where the second equality comes from the fact that P∗ guesses j? correctly indipendently of the
event that A is successful and proof happens. Since the index j is chosen at random in [Q], we
have Prob[P∗ wins] = 1Q ·Prob[A wins ∧ proof]. Whenever P∗ wins, it breaks the soundness of
the interactive scheme: by hypothesis, this happens only with negligible probability. Therefore:
Prob[A wins ∧ proof] = Q · Prob[P∗ wins] ≤ negl(k).
Now we can bound the probability that A succeeds. As we assume, A breaks the simulation
soundness of the scheme with non-negligible probability :
Prob[A wins] ≤ Prob[A wins ∧ proof] + Prob[A wins ∧ proof] ≤ negl(k),
thus  ≤ negl(k), that is a contradiction.
On the quasi-unique responses condition. We remark that assuming (P,V) has quasi-
unique responses is not an artifact of the proof. In fact, without this property, proofs would be
malleable and breaking the simulation soundness would be an easy task. Consider a FS-NIZK
proof system for which responses are not quasi-unique. An efficient adversary A can always
query the simulator on input a false statement x?, obtaining a simulated proof S ′2(x?)→ pi? =
(α?, β?, γ?). Given pi?, A might be able to find, with non-negligible probability, a new response
γ?? 6= γ? such that (α?, β?, γ??) is also accepting. Hence, the scheme cannot be simulation
sound.
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4.2 Weak Simulation Extractability
The argument Fouque and Pointcheval use in [24] to show that the proof system they consider
is simulation sound is roughly as follows. Assume there exists an adversary A which outputs
a pair (x?, pi?) breaking the simulation soundness, as in the experiment of Definition 5. Then,
one can invoke a suitable version of the forking lemma to show that it is possible to “extract” a
witness w? for x? from such an adversary, contradicting the fact that x? is false. The reduction
simulates the list T for A in the simulation soundness experiment, in particular one needs to fake
accepting proofs for (adaptively chosen and potentially false) theorems selected by the attacker.
In order to do so, Fouque and Pointcheval (implicitly) rely on the SS-HVZK property. The
next theorem is a generalization of the above strategy which does not rely on the SS-HVZK
property and indeed applies to arbitrary languages. Moreover, we are able to prove a stronger
statement, namely that Fiat-Shamir proofs satisfy weak simulation extractability (and not only
simulation soundness). For simplicity the following theorem assumes (perfect) unique responses,
but could be generalized using the same reduction as for Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Weak simulation extractability of the Fiat-Shamir transform). Let Σ = (P,V) be
a non-trivial Σ-protocol with unique responses for a language L ∈ NP. In the random oracle
model, the NIZK proof system ΣFS = (PH ,VH) resulting by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform
to Σ is weakly simulation extractable with extraction error ν = Qh for the canonical simulator S.
Here, Q is the number of random oracle queries and h is the number of elements in the range
of H. Furthermore, the extractor EA needs to run AS1(·),S′2(·) twice, where A and EA are both
defined in Definition 6.
Proof. Let S be the canonical zero-knowledge simulator described in the proof of Theorem 2.
Denote with (x?, α?, γ?) the pair statement/proof returned by AS1(·),S′2(·); we describe an ex-
tractor EA, able to compute a witness w? by rewinding A once.
We want to exploit the general forking lemma1. In order to do so, we define program
P(1k, h1, . . . , hQ; ρP) as follows: P virtually splits ρP into two random tapes ρ and ρS (e.g.
by using even bits for ρ and odd bits for ρS) and runs internally AS1(·),S′2(·) with randomness
ρ. P uses values (h1, . . . , hQ) to simulate fresh answers of S1, and ρS to simulate answers
of S2. If AS1(·),S′2(·) outputs (x?, (α?, γ?)), P checks that it is a valid proof and not in T
(otherwise it returns (0,⊥)). Then, because of the unique response property, (x?, α?) must
correspond to some fresh query to S1 and P outputs (J, (x?, α?, γ?)), where J > 0 is the index
corresponding to the random oracle query (x?, α?). We say that P is successful whenever
J ≥ 1, and we denote with acc the corresponding probability. Given program P, we consider
two related runs of P with the same random tape but different hash values, as specified by
the forking algorithm FP of Lemma 1. Denote with (I, (x
?, α?, γ?)) ← P(1k, h1, . . . , hQ; ρ) and
(I ′, (x??, α??, γ??)) ← P(1k, h1, . . . , hI−1, h′I , . . . , h′Q; ρ) the two outputs of A in these runs. By
the forking lemma we know that with probability ext ≥ acc(acc/Q−1/h) the forking algorithm
will return indexes I, I ′ such that I = I ′, I ≥ 1 and hI 6= h′I .
Notice that since FP’s forgeries are relative to the same random oracle query I = I
′, we
must have x? = x?? and α? = α??; on the other hand we have hI 6= h′I . We are thus in
a position to invoke the special extractor E for the underlying proof system, yielding a valid
witness w? ← E(α?, hI , γ?, h′I , γ??, x?) such that (x?, w?) ∈ RL.
Assume now that acc ≥ ν. By applying the general forking lemma1 we obtain that ext ≥
acc2/Q− acc/h. Since Q is polynomial while h is exponentially large in the security parameter,
for sure Qh < 1 (in particular, it is negligible in k). As ν :=
Q
h , we have:
acc2
Q
− acc
h
=
1
Q
(acc2 − acc · ν).
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Now, since acc ≥ ν, we have acc · ν ≥ ν2, that is ν2 − acc · ν ≤ 0. Hence,
1
Q
(acc2 − acc · ν) ≥ 1
Q
(acc2 − 2acc · ν + ν2) = 1
Q
(acc− ν)2.
The previous inequality matches the definition of weak extractability with values p = Q and
d = 2.
5 Applications
In the literature there is a large number of applications for simulation-sound or extractable
NIZKs. One of the first request for simulation soundness comes from the setting of public key
encryption, for the design of encryption schemes with chosen-ciphertext security using the Naor-
Yung (NY) paradigm [36]. At a high level, the NY works as follows: given two key pairs (sk , pk)
and (sk ′, pk ′) for CPA-secure encryption schemes Π and Π′ respectively, a ciphertext consists of
two encryptions c, c′ of the same message m, under different keys pk , pk ′, and a NIZK proof pi
that both c and c′ encrypt m. In order to achieve security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (CCA2), the underlying NIZK must be simulation-sound. While achieving CCA2 security
is probably one of the most prominent application of simulation soundness, simulation-sound
or extractable proofs have been used, e.g., to build also leakage-resilient signatures or KDM
secure encryption. In this section, we review some important applications of such proof systems
and show how our result provides more efficient constructions in the ROM or generalizes earlier
results that use the Fiat-Shamir transform.
5.1 Leakage Resilience
Simulation-sound and simulation-extractable NIZK proofs have been very useful in constructing
leakage-resilient encryption and signature schemes [19, 33, 35]. Here, we consider these works
and show that our result immediately yields efficient leakage-resilient schemes in the random
oracle model.
Leakage-resilient signatures. A signature scheme is leakage resilient if it is hard to forge a
signature even given (bounded) leakage from the signing key. Obviously, this requires that the
amount of leakage given to the adversary has to be smaller than the length of the secret key, as
otherwise the leakage may just reveal such a key, trivially breaking the security of the signature
scheme.
We instantiate the generic construction of leakage-resilient signatures based on leakage-
resilient hard relations and simulation-extractable NIZKs of [19] using the Fiat-Shamir trans-
form. Let R be a λ-leakage-resilient hard relation with sampling algorithm GenR (for detailed
definitions, see Definition 9 and Definition 10 in Appendix D.1). Let (PH ,VH) be a NIZK argu-
ment5 for relation R′ defined by R′((pk ,m), sk)⇔ R(pk , sk). Consider the following signature
scheme:
KeyGen(1k) : Calls (pk , sk)← GenR(1k) and returns the same output.
Sign(sk ,m) : Outputs σ ← PH((pk ,m), sk).6
5As opposed to a proof system where soundness needs to hold unconditionally, in an argument system it is
sufficient that soundness holds with respect to a computationally bounded adversary.
6Note that m is part of the instance being proven.
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Vrf(pk ,m, σ): Verifies the signature by invoking VH((pk ,m), σ).
Notice that σ ← PH((pk ,m), sk) is a NIZK proof for the hard relation obtained by applying
the Fiat-Shamir transform.
We chose to state the theorem below using an argument system as this is the minimal
requirement under which leakage resilience of the scheme can be proven. Since our FS-based
protocols are weakly simulation-extractable NIZK proof systems, they automatically satisfy the
hypothesis of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. If R is a 2λ-leakage-resilient hard relation and (PH ,VH) is a weakly simulation-
extractable NIZK argument with negligible extraction error for relation R′((pk ,m), sk)⇔ R(pk , sk),
then the above scheme is a λ-leakage-resilient signature scheme in the random oracle model.
The proof of the theorem from above follows the one of Theorem 4.3 in [19]. A couple of
subtleties arise, though. The main idea of the proof is to build a reduction from an adversary A
breaking λ-leakage resilience of the signature scheme to an adversary B breaking the hardness
of the 2λ-leakage-resilient hard relation R. Roughly speaking, in the reduction B is given some
instance pk and simulates the signing queries of A by using the zero-knowledge simulator of the
NIZK, and the leakage queries by using the leakage oracle for the relation R. At some point
A outputs a forgery σ? and B invokes the extractor of Theorem 3 to get sk? ← EA(pk , σ?).
The first issue is that we are only guaranteed weak simulation-extractability, whereas the proof
of [19] relies on full simulation-extractability. 7 However, this is not a problem because we just
need to show that B outputs a valid witness with non-negligible probability. A second issue
involves the extractor of Theorem 3, which needs to rewind A once and, thus, to simulate twice
its environment (including the leakage queries). This causes the loss of a factor 2 in the total
amount of tolerated leakage. We refer the reader to Appendix D.2 for the details.
We emphasize that the leakage-resilient signature scheme of Alwen et al. [4], obtained by
applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to the Okamoto identification scheme, follows essentially
the above paradigm. Here, one may view the public and secret keys of the Okamoto ID scheme
as forming an instance of a leakage-resilient hard relation, while the NIZK proof corresponds to
the Fiat-Shamir transform applied to the Okamoto identification protocol.
Naor-Yung with leakage. The definition of IND-CPA and IND-CCA security of an en-
cryption scheme can be extended to the leakage setting by giving the adversary access to a
leakage oracle. Naor and Segev [35] show that the Naor-Yung paradigm instantiated with a
simulation-sound NIZK allows to leverage CPA-security to CCA-security even in the presence
of leakage. In other words, if Π is CPA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks, the encryption
scheme obtained by applying the Naor-Yung paradigm to (Π,Π), using a simulation-sound
NIZK, is CCA2-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks. In Appendix D.3 we revisit their proof
in the ROM, dealing with the issue that the leakage queries can potentially depend on H. We
stress that for the proof only simulation soundness is needed (i.e., our result from Theorem 2)
and not weak simulation extractability.
In what follows, we propose a concrete instantiation of the result above, relying on the
BHHO encryption scheme from [13]. Let G be a group of prime-order q. For randomly selected
generators g1, . . . , g`
$← G, the public key is a tuple pk = (g1, . . . , g`, h), where h =
∏`
i=1 g
zi
i for
a secret key sk = (z1, . . . , z`) ∈ Z`q. To encrypt a message m ∈ G, choose a random r $← Zq and
output c = (c1, . . . , c`+1) = (g
r
1, . . . , g
r
` ,m · hr). The message m can be recovered by computing
m = c`+1 · (
∏`
i=1 c
zi
i )
−1.
7Actually, they rely on a weaker property called true simulation-extractability [19].
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Assuming that the DDH problem is hard in G, Naor and Segev [35] showed that the BHHO
encryption scheme is CPA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks for any ` = 2 + λ+ω(log k)log q , where
k is the security parameter. Applying the Naor-Yung paradigm, consider the language:
L = {(c, pk , c′, pk ′) : ∃r, r′ ∈ Zq,m ∈ G s.t.
c = (gr1, . . . , g
r
` , h
r ·m), c′ = (gr′1 , . . . , gr
′
` , h
′r′ ·m)},
where c = (c1, . . . , c`+1) and c
′ = (c′1, . . . , c′`+1) are BHHO encryptions with randomness r
and r′, using public keys pk = (g1, . . . , g`, h) and pk ′ = (g1, . . . , g`, h′) respectively. The pair
w = (r, r′) is a witness for a string x = (c, pk , c′, pk ′) ∈ L. Consider the following interactive
protocol Σ = (P,V) for the above language:
1. P chooses s, s′ at random from Zq and computes the commitment:
~α = ((α1, ..., α`), (α
′
1, ..., α
′
`), α
′′) = ((gs1, ..., g
s
` ), (g
s′
1 , ..., g
s′
` ), h
s · (h′)s′).
2. The verifier V chooses a random challenge β $← Zq.
3. The prover computes the response ~γ = (γ, γ′) = (s− β · r, s′ + β · r′).
4. Given a proof pi = (~α, β,~γ), the verifier V checks that:
(α1, . . . , α`) = (g
γ
1 · cβ1 , . . . , gγ` · cβ` )
(α′1, . . . , α
′
`) = (g
γ′
1 · (c′1)−β, . . . , gγ
′
` · (c′`)−β)
α′′ = hγ · (h′)γ′ · (c`+1 · (c′`+1)−1)β.
In Appendix D.4 we prove that the above protocol is a Σ-protocol for the language L. With
the Naor-Yung paradigm applied to the BHHO encryption scheme we get a ciphertext (c, c′, pi)
consisting of 4` + 3 elements in G plus 2 elements in Zq. Moreover, the fact that the BHHO
encryption scheme is CPA-secure against key leakage together with the result of Naor-, show
that the above instantiation is CCA-secure against key-leakage attacks.
Corollary 1. Let k be a security parameter. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard in G, the
Naor-Yung paradigm applied to the BHHO encryption scheme yields an encryption scheme that
is CCA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks in the random oracle model for λ = ` log q(1− 2` −
ω(log k)
` log q ) = L(1− o(1)), where L is the length of the secret key. An encryption consists of 4`+ 3
elements in G plus 2 elements in Zq.
5.2 Key-Dependent Message Security
Key-dependent message (KDM) security of a public-key encryption scheme requires that the
scheme remains secure even against attackers allowed to see encryptions of the value f(sk),
where f ∈ F for some class of functions F .
Camenisch, Chandran and Shoup [14] show that a variation of the Naor-Yung paradigm
instantiated with a simulation-sound NIZK can still leverage CPA-security to CCA-security,
even in the context of KDM security. We revisit their proof in the random oracle model in
Appendix D.5. Also in this case, only simulation soundness is needed for the proof.
Roughly, for some function family F , if Π is KDM[F ]-CPA secure and Π′ is CPA-secure,
the scheme Π′′ obtained by applying the Naor-Yung paradigm to (Π,Π′) — i.e., an encryption
of m ∈ M is a tuple c′′ = (c, c′, pi) where c encrypts m under Π, c′ encrypts m under Π′ and pi
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is a simulation-sound NIZK proof that c and c′ encrypt the same message — is KDM[F ]-CCA
secure.
Let sk i[j] denote the j-th bit of sk i. The BHHO encryption scheme was the first KDM-CPA
secure encryption scheme, with respect to the class of all projection functions F↓ = Fread∪Fflip,
where
Fread =
{
fi,j : ~sk → sk i[j]
}
i,j
and Fflip =
{
fi,j : ~sk → 1− sk i[j]
}
i,j
.
More generally, when the message space is a linear space over Zq, we define the function class
PJ (F↓) as the class of all affine combinations of elements in F↓.
Now we can instantiate the general transform of [14] as follows. We choose Π to be BHHO,
Π′ to be ElGamal (say with pk ′ = h′ = gz
′
1
1 ) and we build a Σ-protocol Σ
′ for the Naor-
Yung language relative to Π and Π′. Protocol Σ′ can be easily derived from protocol Σ of
the last section, by just compressing the commitment as in ~α = ((gs1, . . . , g
s
` ), g
s′
1 , h
s · (h′)s′)
(and simplifying the verification procedure accordingly). Hence, Theorem 2 yields the following
result.
Corollary 2. Assuming that the DDH problem is hard in G, the Naor-Yung paradigm in-
stantiated with BHHO and ElGamal encryption schemes yields a KDM[PJ (F↓)]-CCA secure
encryption scheme in the random oracle model. An encryption consists of `+ 3 elements in G
plus 3 elements in Zq.
Beyond Naor-Yung. Another paradigm that yields chosen-ciphertext security from NIZKs,
based on proving knowledge of the plaintext, was suggested by Rackoff and Simon [38]. Such a
construction is somewhat more natural and more efficient than the twin-encryption paradigm:
a message m is encrypted (only once) under a CPA-secure encryption scheme, and a NIZK
proof of knowledge of the plaintext is attached to the ciphertext. However, (to the best of our
knowledge) truly efficient constructions for sufficiently strong NIZK proofs of knowledge are not
available even using random oracles. One can hope that using the weaker from of extractability
afforded by the Fiat-Shamir transform one could at least obtain NM-CPA secure encyption,
and this is indeed what is aimed at in the ongoing work of [9].
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A Defining Proofs of Knowledge
Many different definitions of proof of knowledge have been proposed in the literature. According
to Unruh [41], it is possible to identify three main distinct notions, which he refers to as A, B
and C-style PoKs.
Definition 8 (PoK). Let ν : {0, 1}∗ → [0, 1] be a function and R be a binary relation, with
corresponding language LR. A protocol (P,V) is a proof of knowledge for R, with knowledge
error ν if the following properties hold:
Completeness. For any pair (x,w) ∈ R, if P and V follow the protocol specification on public
input x and private input w (held by P), then the verifier accepts.
Validity. There exist a probabilistic oracle machine E and a constant c > 0 such that, for
any x ∈ LR, whenever a prover P∗ convinces V on common input x with probability
(|x|) > ν(|x|), then the extractor EP∗, taking x as an input and having oracle access to
P∗, outputs a witness w such that R(x,w) = 1,
(A-style) working in strict polynomial time, with probability at least
((|x|)− ν(|x|))c
p
for c > 0 and a polynomial p.
(B-style) within expected number of steps bounded by
xc
(|x|)− ν(|x|) .
(C-style) working in expected polynomial time, with probability at least
(|x|)− ν(|x|)
p
.
B Honest-verifier zero-knowledge and neighborhood
The HVZK property essentially says there exists a simulator S that produces, on input x,
transcripts that are indistinguishable from real conversations between P and V sharing input
x, as long as V behaves honestly. It is possible to give stronger flavors of this property. A
first example is the case of special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK), as introduced by
Cramer, Damg˚ard and Schoenmakers [17]. Intuitively, this property says that the simulator
S can take any β as input and produce a conversation indistinguishable from the space of
all conversations between honest parties in which β is the challenge. To formalize this, the
experiments of Definition 1 are modified in such a way that both the verifier and the simulator
get also β as input. Even though the S-HVZK property is seemingly stronger than the plain
HVZK property, the two notions are essentially equivalent. In fact, as Fischlin showed in [23],
any Σ-protocol where the challenge has size logarithmic in the security parameter, satisfies the
stronger requirement of S-HVZK.
A stronger variant of zero-knowledge — first introduced by Bellare and Ristov [7] — is strong
special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SS-HVZK), which differs from the previous one in the
fact that the simulator has to produce indistinguishable triplets (α, β, γ) where the string γ can
be chosen at random and S can compute the commitment α trough a deterministic function φ of
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Prover P ′(x,w) Verifier V ′(x)
r
$← {0, 1}∗, α← P0(x,w) α
′=(α,r)−→
β←− β ← V0(x, α)
z = f(r), γ ← P1(α′, β′, x, w) γ
′=(γ,z)−→ Accept iff
V1(x, α, β, γ) = 1
and z = f(r)
Figure 2: The protocol Σ′, separating SS-HVZK and S-HVZK.
x, β and γ, i.e. α := φ(x, β, γ). We exhibit a separation between the SS-HVZK and S-HVZK
properties, by showing that any Σ-protocol which is SS-HVZK can be turned into another
Σ-protocol which is still S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK. For proving such a claim, we just need
to assume the existence of one-way functions. The transform is depicted in Figure 2. Let
f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ be a one-way function. We start with an arbitrary Σ-protocol Σ = (P,V)
which satisfies the SS-HVZK property. The protocol Σ′ = (P ′,V ′) is essentially identical to Σ,
however the prover now also samples a random r and adds r to the commitment α; moreover it
also appends z = f(r) to the last message. The verifier V ′ runs the verifier V, but also checks
that z = f(r).
Proposition 2 (Separation between S-HVZK and SS-HVZK). Assuming the existence of one-
way functions, there exists a Σ-protocol which is S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK. More precisely,
let Σ = (P,V) be a Σ-protocol which is SS-HVZK and f be a one-way function. Then, the
protocol Σ′ = (P ′,V ′) of Figure 2 is S-HVZK but not SS-HVZK.
Proof. We show that the protocol Σ′ cannot satisfy the stronger SS-HVZK property, even if
the original protocol Σ does. The intuition for this is that, if it could be possible to compute
the commitment α′ after having chosen the challenge β and the response γ′, then it could also
be possible to invert f . We now turn this intuition into a formal proof. Assume, towards a
contradiction, that Σ′ is SS-HVZK. This means that there exists a simulator S ′ which can
choose γ′ at random (for all β), and compute α′ = (α, r) as a deterministic function α′ =
φ(x, β, γ′) of the other values. We now show how to use S ′ to build a PPT adversary B able to
break one-wainess of the function f . The attacker B simply chooses a random image z $← {0, 1}∗,
samples β, γ at random and runs S ′(x, β, γ′ = (γ, z), 1k) which returns α′ = φ(x, β, γ′). Since
α′ = (α, r) is such that f(r) = z, the adversary B has found a pre-image of z, namely r = f−1(z),
breaking the one-wayness of f . Note, however, that the protocol Σ′ is still S-HVZK. In fact,
for every β, the (special) HVZK simulator S ′ can just run the SS-HVZK simulator S of the
underlying protocol Σ, yielding α ← S(x, β, γ, 1k), and later append r $← {0, 1}∗ to α and
z = f(r) to γ by itself.
C Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is similar to the proof of [41, Theorem 2]. Consider an adversary A having access to
(S1,S ′2) that outputs a pair (x, pi) which makes the verifier V ′ of the composed system accept,
i.e. V ′S1(x, pi) = 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that A consists of n machines Ai,
each machine running the i-th execution in the composed system. For i ≥ 2, Ai expects some
state st from Ai−1; such a state includes a proof pi and the internal coin tosses ρ of Ai−1. Let
E be the extractor for (P,V). We construct an extractor E ′ for (P ′,V ′) as follows. E ′ chooses
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an index i ∈ [n] uniformly at random and internally simulates the first i − 1 executions of the
composed system (with A1, . . . ,Ai−1). Let st = (pi, ρ) be the state that Ai−1 passes to Ai. E ′
computes w ← EAi(x, st) = EAi(x, pi; ρ).
Denote with ai the probability that A is successful in the first i executions. (Note that
in particular ai−1 is the probability that in an execution of E ′ the internal simulation of the
first i − 1 executions succeeds.) Let ci denote the probability that the i-th execution of the
composed system succeeds, conditioned on the event that the first i− 1 executions succeed. We
have a0 = 1 and ai = ci · ai−1 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Denote with ext′ the probability that E ′ extracts a witness and with acc′ the probability
that A is successful in the composed system. Moreover, for some fixed index i, let ext′i be
the probability that E ′ succeeds given that index i was chosen. Hence, we must have ext′ =∑n
i=1
1
next
′
i ≥ max1≤i≤n 1next′i.
We proceed to bound ext′i. Denote with Di−1 the probability distribution of the state
output by Ai−1 conditioned on the fact that the first i− 1 executions were successful. Clearly,
the probability that E ′ succeeds conditioned on the event that the first i − 1 executions were
successful is E[exti(st)], where exti(st) denotes the probability that EAi(x, st) outputs a witness.
Hence, ext′i = ai−1E[exti(st)], where st is distributed accordingly to Di−1. Using the hypothesis
that (P,V) has extraction error ν, we get that there exists a constant d > 0 and a polynomial
p such that exti(st) ≥ 1p(acci(st)− ν)d for all st, where acci(st) denotes the probability that Ai
is successful using state st. Putting all together, we can conclude:
ext′i = ai−1E [exti(st)] ≥ ai−1 · E
[
1
p
(acci(st)− ν)d
]
≥ ai−1
p
(E [acci(st)]− ν)d = ai−1
p
(ci − ν)d,
where the second inequality in the chain is obtained by applying Jensen’s inequality E[f(X)] ≥
f(E[X]) (for any random variable X and convex function f).
Let now δ = (acc′ − νn). Assume that δ > 0 otherwise there is nothing to prove.
Claim 1. There exists an index i ∈ [n] such that
ai−1 < νi−1 + (i− 1) δ
n
and ai ≥ νi + i δ
n
.
Proof of claim. We need to prove that there exists some i ∈ [n] such that
ai−1 − ai ≤ νi−1 + (i− 1) δ
n
− νi − i δ
n
= νi−1 − νi − δ
n
.
Assume, towards a contradiction, that for all indexes i ∈ [n] we have ai−1 − ai > νi−1 − νi − δn .
Then, we get
a0 − an =
n∑
i=1
(ai−1 − ai) >
n∑
i=1
(
νi−1 − νi − δ
n
)
= −δ +
n∑
i=1
(νi−1 − νi)
= νn − acc′ + 1− νn = 1− acc′.
However this is impossible, because by construction a0 − an = 1− acc′.
For the index i of the above claim, we have
ai−1(ci − ν) = ai − ai−1ν ≥
(
νi + i
δ
n
)
−
(
νi − (i− 1) δ
n
)
=
δ
n
,
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and hence
ext′ ≥ 1
n
max
1≤i≤n
ai−1
p
(ci − ν)d ≥ 1
n
max
1≤i≤n
adi−1
p
(ci − ν)d
≥ 1
n
max
1≤i≤n
(
δ
n
)d
=
1
p · nd+1 (acc
′ − νn)d.
Since p · nd+1 = p′, the proposition follows.
D Details Omitted from Applications
D.1 Definitions of Leakage-Resilient Primitives
Leakage-Resilient Hard Relations and Signatures. For completeness, we recall some
definitions from [19] that we mention in section 5.1.
Definition 9 (Leakage-resilient hard relation). A binary relation R ⊂ {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}∗ is called
λ-leakage-resilient hard relation if: (i) there exists an efficient sampling algorithm GenR such
that for any pair (pk , sk) ← GenR(1k), it holds R(pk , sk) = 1, (ii) deciding whether a pair
satisfies R(pk , sk) = 1 or not can be done in polynomial time, (iii) any efficient adversary A
has negligible advantage in winning the experiment defined below:
Experiment ExpLK-RELR,A (1k)
(pk , sk)← GenR(1k)
sk? ← AOλsk (·)(pk)
Output 1 if R(pk , sk?) = 1
that is, for any PPT A, it holds:
Prob[ExpLK-RELR,A (1
k) = 1] ≤ negl(k)
Definition 10 (Leakage-resilient signature). Let Π = (Gen,Sign,Vrf) be a signature scheme.
The following experiment models an unforgeability game where the adversary gets leakage infor-
mation on the signing key.
Experiment ExpLKR-SIGNΠ,A (1k)
(pk , sk)← KeyGen(1k)
(m?, σ?)← ASign(sk ,·),Oλsk (·)(pk)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. Vrf(pk ,m?, σ?) = 1
2. (m?, σ?) /∈ T
In the experiment above, T is a list containing queries to Sign and corresponding answers. A
signature scheme Π is λ-leakage resilient if any PPT adversary A has only negligible advantage
in winning the unforgeability game:
Prob[ExpLKR-SIGNΠ,A (1
k) = 1] ≤ negl(k)
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Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption. We recall the definitions of CPA and CCA
security against λ-key-leakage attacks from [35]. Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public key
encryption scheme and denote with PKk, SKk the sets of public/secret keys that are produced
by Gen(1k). We define an oracle Oλsk depending on a secret key sk ∈ SKk, which takes as input
(the description of) functions fi : SKk → {0, 1}λi . An oracle machine A is a λ-key-leakage
adversary if A has access to Oλsk and the total leakage is bounded by
∑
i λi ≤ λ. Consider the
following experiments:
Experiment ExpLKG-CPAΠ,A (1k)
(pk , sk)← Gen(1k)
(m0,m1)← AO
λ
sk (·)
0 (pk)
cb ← Enc(pk ,mb) for b $← {0, 1}
b′ ← A1(cb)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. b′ = b
2. |m0| = |m1|
Experiment ExpLKG-CCAΠ,A (1k)
(pk , sk)← Gen(1k)
(m0,m1)← ADec(sk ,·),O
λ
sk (·)
0 (pk)
cb ← Enc(pk ,mb) for b $← {0, 1}
b′ ← ADec(sk ,·)1 (cb)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. b′ = b
2. |m0| = |m1|
3. cb is never submitted to Dec(sk , ·)
We stress that in the experiments above, A is not allowed to query the leakage oracle after
seeing the challenge ciphertext. (In fact, a single bit of leakage on the challenge ciphertext
would allow her to win the game with probability 1.)
Definition 11 (ATK-secure encryption against λ-key-leakage attacks). For ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA},
we say a public key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is ATK-secure against λ-key-leakage
attacks if, for every PPT λ-key-leakage adversary A = (A0,A1) as above, we have:
Prob[ExpLKG-ATKΠ,A (1
k) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(k).
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4
This proof follows the same strategy given in [19], Theorem 4.3, with minor changes. We
consider the following two games:
Game 0: This is the unforgeability game of Definition 10 tailored for leakage-resilient signa-
tures described in 5.1.
Game 1: In this game, we change the way in which the signing oracle answers to A’s queries.
Instead of giving valid proofs pii, it answers signature queries mi with simulated proofs
S(pk ,mi). Notice that we use a simplified notation and denote S the simulator that
combines S1 (which answers queries to the random oracle) and S2 (which generates the
proofs) from Definition 4.
In Game 1, the winning condition of A is still to compute a valid forgery, i.e., to compute
(m?, σ?) such that Vrf(pk ,m?, σ?) = 1. The transition from Game 0 to Game 1 is based
on the indistinguishability between proofs produced by the prover and proofs computed by
the simulator. For the unbounded non-interactive zero-knowledge property of the scheme, the
success probability in the two games turns out to be negligibly close. Indeed, the adversary does
not notice whether she is talking to the signing oracle Signsk or to the simulator S. Suppose
for sake of contradiction that the success probability of A, that we denote , is non-negligible
(wlog, we bound the success probability of A for Game 1).
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We next construct an adversary B that runs A as a subroutine and breaks the security of
the leakage-resilient hard relation R. Adversary B behaves as follows: after receiving pk as
the challenge for the hard relation, it simulates the environment for A and answers her oracle
queries. To this end, B forwards A’s leakage queries, addressed to oracle Oλsk , to its own oracle
O2λsk , and returns the answer to A. To answer signing queries for mi, B creates simulated proofs
σi ← S(pk ,mi). When A outputs a forgery (m?, σ?), adversary B runs the extractor EA(pk , σ?)
to obtain sk?, hence outputs this value as a witness for pk . Notice that by running the extractor
EA(pk , σ?), we need to rewind A which requires to simulate its leakage queries again. Hence,
the need for a 2λ leakage oracle (cf. Theorem 3).
It remains to analyze the success probability of B in breaking the security of the leakage-
resilient hard relationR(pk , sk). Let Win be the event thatA wins in Game 1, that is she outputs
a pair (m?, σ?) accepted by VH , and let Ext be the event that the extractor EA computes a valid
witness sk? (cf. Definition 6). We have
Prob[ExpLK-RELR,B (1
k) = 1] ≥ Prob[Win ∧ Ext] (1)
= Prob[Ext|Win] · Prob[Win] (2)
≥ (1− negl(k))
d
p(k)
·  (3)
In the above, Eq. (1) uses the fact that if A produces a valid forgery (m,σ?) and the extractor
EA succeeds and outputs a valid witness sk? from such forgery, then B wins: indeed, it simply
returns sk?. This implies that:
Prob[ExpLK-RELR,B (1
k) = 1] ≥ Prob[Win ∧ Ext]
In Eq. (2), we use the definition of conditional probability. In Eq. (3) we use the fact
that (PH ,VH) has negligible extraction error and that conditioned on Win the verification
always succeeds, i.e., acc = 1 in Theorem 3. Finally, in Eq. (3) we use our assumption that
 := Prob[Win] is non-negligible, which implies that for any polynomial p and constant d,

p(k) · (1 − negl(k))d is also non-negligible. This yields a contradiction to the security of the
leakage-resilient hard relation R and concludes the proof.
D.3 Revisiting Naor-Segev in the ROM
Naor-Yung paradigm. In the random oracle model, the Naor-Yung (NY) construction con-
siders two encryption schemes with CPA-security Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec), Π′ = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′)
and a NIZK proof system (PH ,VH) for the following language:
LNY =
{
(c, c′, pk , pk ′) : ∃m, r, r′ s.t. c = Enc(pk ,m; r), c′ = Enc′(pk ′,m; r′)} ,
where the public keys pk and pk ′ are generated by Gen and Gen′ respectively. The new encryp-
tion scheme Π∗ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗) is as follows:
Key generation: Runs (pk , sk) ← Gen(1k), (pk ′, sk ′) ← Gen′(1k), and outputs keys ~pk =
(pk , pk ′) and ~sk = (sk , sk ′).
Encryption: Computes ciphertexts c = Enc(pk ,m; r) and c′ = Enc′(pk ′,m; r′), invokes the
prover PH on public input (c, c′, pk , pk ′) and private input (m, r, r′) to get a NIZK proof
pi for (c, c′, pk , pk ′) ∈ LNY .
Decryption: Checks the validity of proof pi by calling the (public) verification procedure
VH((c, c′), pi). If pi is accepted, uses decryption algorithm Dec(sk , ·) on ciphertext c.
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The extension of the Naor-Yung paradigm of twin encryption to the key-leakage framework
has been proven by Naor and Segev [35] for NIZK proofs in the CRS model. They show
that, when the NY paradigm is applied to leakage-resilient schemes, the resulting CCA-secure
encryption scheme is still leakage-resilient. More precisely, starting from an encryption schemes
Π which is CPA-secure against λ-key-leakage attacks, one gets a CCA-secure encryption scheme
Π∗ secure against λ-key-leakage attacks. The proof of Naor and Segev is similar to the one
appeared in [34], except for the presence of a leakage oracle Oλsk . The intuition is that a
ciphertext (c, c′, pi) can be decrypted by using only one secret key. Indeed, given knowledge
of one of the two secret keys, decryption can be carried out by checking the validity of pi (the
verification procedure is public) and decrypting the corresponding ciphertext with the known
secret key. In the leakage setting, the CPA-attacker has also to answer to leakage queries made
by the CCA-attacker. Again, a single secret key is sufficient for this purpose.
Below, we prove the ROM-equivalent of the result above when NIZKs are built in the random
oracle model (in particular, when using the Fiat-Shamir transform). The only potential issue is
that, since the random oracle is public, leakage functions might also depend on it. However, since
we make use of Fiat-Shamir NIZKs, this fact does not affect the proof because the random oracle
takes as input only public data (namely, the statement x to be proven and the commitment α
in the NIZK proof).
Theorem 5 (ROM equivalent of [35]). Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and Π′ = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) be
two public-key encryption schemes secure against λ-key-leakage chosen-plaintext attacks, and let
(PH ,VH) be a simulation-sound NIZK proof system for the Naor-Yung language LNY associated
to (Π,Π′). In the random oracle model, the encryption scheme Π∗ obtained via the Naor-Yung
paradigm is secure against adaptive λ-key-leakage chosen-ciphertext attacks.
In the random oracle setting, the proof presented in [35] can be mirrored in a straightforward
way: it suffices to simply replace the CRS-based NIZK with an analogous NIZK proof system in
the ROM. In fact, irrespective of the model being considered, the proof pi can be computed by
the encryption algorithm Enc∗ and validated by the decryption procedure Dec∗ by invoking, in
turn, prover and verifier. The presence of random oracles does not change the behavior of the
leakage oracle. Nevertheless, we propose a new approach which traces out the proof appeared
in [14], in the context of KDM security.
Proof. Consider the LKG-CCA experiment adapted for the NY construction:
Experiment ExpLKG-CCAΠ∗,A (1k):
(pk , pk ′, sk , sk ′)← Gen∗(1k); b $← {0, 1}
(m0,m1)← ADec
∗(sk ,·),Oλsk (·)
0 (pk , pk
′)
cb = Enc(pk ,mb; r); c
′
b ← Enc′(pk ′,mb; r′)
pi ← PH((cb, c′b, pk , pk ′), (mb, r, r′)); ~cb := (cb, c′b, pi)
b′ ← ADec
∗(sk ,·),Oλsk (·)
1 (pk , pk
′,~cb)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. b′ = b
2. |m0| = |m1|
3. cb not asked to Dec
∗(sk , ·)
Dec∗(c, c′, pi):
if VH((c, c′), pi) = 1
m = Dec(sk , c)
Return m
Oλsk (f):
Return f(sk)
We stress that, even if not explicitly written (for better readability), the leakage functions f
may depend on the random oracle H. However, such a dependence does not give any significant
advantage to the adversary. In what follows, we derive a series of games whose outcomes cannot
be mutually distinguished, as long as one does not violate the hypothesis of the theorem.
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Game 0. We consider the LKG-CCA experiment defined above, in the case the random bit is
b = 0. Observe that the challenge ciphertext (cb, c
′
b, pi) contains encryptions of the same
message m0.
Game 1. This game differs from the previous one in that the proof pi attached to the challenge
ciphertext is not properly generated by the prover, but computed by the ZK simulator.
Game 2. As in Game 1, but in the challenge phase the ciphertext c′b is computed as c
′
b ←
Enc′(pk ′,m1). As a consequence, the attached proof pi is a fake one, since cb and c′b
encrypt m0 and m1 respectively.
Game 3. This game is defined as Game 2 but the decryption oracle uses the secret key sk ′
instead of sk , i.e. answers to queries (c, c′, pi) by computing Dec′(sk ′, c′).
Game 4. Again, we change the encryption oracle in such a way that the first ciphertext c
encrypts the message m1. This means that the challenge ciphertext contains Enc(pk ,m1)
and Enc′(pk ′,m1), both encryptions of the same message m1, hence it is a valid ciphertext.
Game 5. As in Game 4, but we restore the prover PH to compute proofs.
Game 6. Game 6 differs from the previous one in that the decryption oracle restart to invoke
Dec(sk , ·) on input the first ciphertext c (and the leakage oracle also uses sk). This is the
experiment LKG-CCA for b = 1.
Denote by Si the adversary success in Game i, for i = 0, 1, . . . , 6. Observe that |Prob[S0] −
Prob[S6]| bounds the advantage of a (λ-key-leakage) CCA-adversary attacking the scheme Π∗.
We show that the difference |Prob[Si] − Prob[Si+1]| is negligible for any i = 1, . . . 5, which
implies the former.
0→ 1 The transition between games 0 and 1 is based on the indistinguishability of NIZK proofs
properly computed from proofs generated by the simulator. Indeed, if the probabilities
of winning in the two games were not negligibly close, one could build an efficient distin-
guisher able to detect whether a proof comes from the prover PH or from the simulator S.
1→ 2 CPA-security of the encryption scheme Π′ means that no efficient adversary can distin-
guish between encryptions of different messages under the same public key. In particular,
encryption of different messages under the same public key pk ′ are indistinguishable.
Game 1 and Game 2 differ only in the way the challenge ciphertext (cb, c
′
b, pi) is generated:
ciphertext c′b equals Enc
′(pk ′,m0) in the first case, while in Game 2 it is Enc′(pk ′,m1).
Thus, any PPT distinguisher who recognizes which games is involved with could be di-
rectly used to discern which one of the two plaitexts has been encrypted.
2→ 3 The difference between Game 2 and Game 3 lies in the way the decryption oracle answers
adversarial queries (c, c′, pi), namely by decrypting c with key sk or c′ with key sk ′, respec-
tively. The only chance to tell apart the two experiments is to query the decryption oracle
with an invalid ciphertext (c, c′, pi) such that c and c′ are the encryptions of different mes-
sages. This would require to produce an accepting proof pi? for a pair (c, c′) /∈ LNY (the
decryption oracle checks the validity of the proof before allowing decryption). Observe
that in both games, the adversary actually receives a fake (simulated) accepting proof for
a false statement (since one of the ciphertext encrypts m0 and the other encrypts m1), and
she might potentially gain some information from that proof. However, the simulation
soundness of the proof system forbids her to produce a new accepting proof for a false
statement.
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3→ 4 The transition between Game 3 and Game 4 is equivalent to the one involving games
1 and 2, that we have already discussed. Since the scheme Π is CPA-secure, indistin-
guishability of ciphertexts Enc(pk ,m0) and Enc(pk ,m1) implies that the probabilities of
succeeding in the two games are negligibly close.
4→ 5 Another symmetry makes similar the transition from Game 4 to Game 5 with the one
between games 0 and 1: indistinguishability follows from the zero-knowledge property of
the non-interactive proof system.
5→ 6 Game 6 differs from Game 5 in that the decryption oracle restarts to decrypt ciphertext c
by using secret key sk , as in the original experiment. To notice the difference, an efficient
distinguisher should be able to produce an invalid ciphertext (c, c′, pi), hence an accepted
proof pi for a false statement, as for the transition between games 2 and 3. We have
already seen that no adversary is allowed to do so, otherwise the simulation soundness of
the proof system would be broken. Moreover, in games 5 and 6, the challenge ciphertext
contains two encryptions of the same message m1, that means it is a valid ciphertext.
The adversary is not even allowed to get fake simulated proof, thus producing fresh fake
proofs would in fact violate the soundness property of the proof system.
D.4 Σ-Protocol for BHHO
Proof. Completeness condition is trivially satisfied. In order to prove that the protocol is
special sound, let pi1 = (~α, β1, ~γ1) and pi2 = (~α, β2, ~γ2) be two different accepted proofs for a
given theorem x = (c, pk , c′, pk ′), with challenges β1 6= β2. We show how to extract a witness
for x ∈ L. The validity of both proofs implies that, for any i = 1, . . . , `, we have:
αi = g
γ1
i · cβ1i = gγ2i · cβ2i
α′i = g
γ′1
i · (c′i)−β1 = g
γ′2
i · (c′i)−β2
and
α′′ = hγ1 · (h′)γ′1 · (c`+1 · (c′`+1)−1)β1 = hγ2 · (h′)γ
′
2 · (c`+1 · (c′`+1)−1)β2 .
From the first pair of equations we can easily compute g
(γ1−γ2)
i = c
(β1−β2)
i and g
(γ′1−γ′2)
i =
(c′i)
(β2−β1). Hence, since the challenges are distinct, we can invert (β2 − β1), obtaining ci =
g
(γ1−γ2)(β1−β2)−1
i and c
′
i = g
(γ′1−γ′2)(β2−β1)−1
i . Finally, setting ρ = (γ1 − γ2)(β1 − β2)−1 and
ρ′ = (γ′1− γ′2)(β2−β1)−1 yields a witness w = (ρ, ρ′) for the statement x. Indeed, for any index
i = 1, . . . , ` it holds ci = g
ρ
i , c
′
i = g
ρ′
i and
c`+1 · (c′`+1)−1 = hρ · (hρ
′
)−1.
The last equations prove that the ciphertexts encrypt the same message, that is to say the
statement x is in L.
It’s not difficult to see that the protocol is not only HVZK, but also SS-HVZK. Indeed,
computing the response ~γ as the third move of the prover is the same as choosing it at random
in Zq × Zq, because both s and β, like so s′ and β′, are chosen at random. Once a response ~γ
is chosen, for any challenge β we can easily compute a commitment ~α in such a way that the
triplet (~α, β,~γ) satisfies the check: this is a consequences of the special form the verification
procedure has, that directly shows how to compute ~α. Given this, a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm which acts as an SS-HVZK simulator can be described.
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D.5 Revisiting Camenisch-Chandran-Shoup in the ROM
Let Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme and denote with PKk, SKk the sets
of public/secret keys that are produced by Gen(1k). Also, for integer n, denote with Gen(n)(1k)
the algorithm which outputs two vectors ( ~pk , ~sk) containing n public/secret keys. Given the
message space M, consider the family of functions:
F (n) ⊂ {f : SKnk →M} F =
∞⋃
n=1
F (n).
We define an oracle ∆b(i, f) depending on a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and taking as input an index i ∈ [n]
and a function f ∈ F . Whenever b = 1, the oracle returns Enc(pk i, f( ~sk)) (i.e., an encryption
of f( ~sk) under the i-th public key in ~pk); otherwise it returns Enc(pk i, 0) (i.e., the encryption
of a fixed message in M). Consider the following experiments:
Experiment ExpKDM-CPAΠ,A,F (1k)
( ~pk , ~sk)← Gen(n)(1k)
b′ ← A∆b(·,·)( ~pk)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. b′ = b
Experiment ExpKDM-CCAΠ,A,F (1k)
( ~pk , ~sk)← Gen(n)(1k)
b′ ← A∆b(·,·),Dec(·,·)( ~pk)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. b′ = b
2. Dec(i, ·) not queried on c← ∆b(i, ·)
Note that oracle Dec(i, c) outputs Dec(sk i, c).
Definition 12 (KDM-ATK secure encryption). For ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}, we say a public-
key encryption scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is KDM[F ]-ATK secure if, for every probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A as above and for all n, we have:
Prob[ExpKDM-ATKΠ,A,F (1
k) = 1] ≤ 1
2
+ negl(k).
Simulation soundness and CCA-KDM security. As shown in [14, Appendix A.1], a
variation of the Naor-Yung paradigm instantiated with a simulation-sound NIZK can leverage
CPA-security to CCA-security in the context of KDM security, provided that one of the two
encryption scheme already satisfy KDM-CPA security. The basic elements are an encryption
scheme Π = (Gen,Enc,Dec) with KDM-CPA security with respect a given class of function F ,
a CPA-secure encryption scheme Π′ = (Gen′,Enc′,Dec′) and a simulation sound NIZK proof
system (PH ,VH) for the NY language associated to (Π,Π′). The combined encryption scheme
Π∗ = (Gen∗,Enc∗,Dec∗) is defined as in the original NY paradigm of twin encryption (see
Section D.3).
The statement below is the ROM-equivalent of [14]. The proof strategy is essentially the
same already used in the proof of Theorem 5, the only difference being the instantiation of Π
with a KDM-CPA scheme.
Theorem 6 (ROM-equivalent of [14]). Let Π be a KDM-CPA secure encryption scheme with
respect to a class of function F , Π′ be a CPA-secure encryption scheme and let (PH ,VH) be
a simulation-sound NIZK proof system for the Naor-Yung language LNY associated to (Π,Π′).
In the random oracle model, the encryption scheme Π∗ obtained via the Naor-Yung paradigm is
KDM-CCA secure with respect to the class of function F .
Proof. We only sketch the proof. Consider the KDM-CCA experiment adapted for the NY
construction:
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Experiment ExpKDM-CCAΠ∗,A,F (1k):
( ~pk , ~sk)← Gen∗(1k)
b′ ← A∆b(·,·),Dec∗(·,·)( ~pk)
Output 1 if and only if:
1. b′ = b
2. Dec(i, ·) not queried on c← ∆b(i, ·)
Dec∗(i, (c, c′, pi)):
if VH((c, c′), pi) = 1
m = Dec(sk i, c)
Return m
∆b(i, f) :
if b = 1 output Enc∗(pk i, f( ~sk))
else output Enc∗(pk i, 0|f(
~sk)|)
Note that the i-th key in vector ~pk has a type (pk i, pk
′
i) (one key for Π and the other one for
Π′), and the same holds for ~sk . Consider the following games:
Game 0. Is the KDM-CCA experiment defined above, when b = 0.
Game 1. This game differs from the previous one in that the proof pi and queries to the
random oracle are not computed using PH and H respectively, but are produced by the
ZK simulator. This is indistinguishable by the unbounded zero-knowledge property of the
proof system.
Game 2. As in Game 1, but encryption queries for index i are answered by computing the
second ciphertext as c′ ← Enc′(pk ′i, 0|f( ~sk)|). (Hence, the attached proof pi is a simulated
proof of a false statement.) This is indistinguishable due to the CPA-security of Π′.
Game 3. This game is defined as Game 2 but decryption queries for index i are answered
by using secret key sk ′i instead of sk i, i.e. answer to queries (i, (c, c′, pi)) by comput-
ing Dec′(sk ′i, c′) whenever pi is accepted. This is indistinguishable due to the simulation
soundness of the proof system.
Game 4. We change the encryption oracle in such a way that the first ciphertext is computed
as c← Enc(pk i, 0|f( ~sk)|). This is indistinguishable due to the KDM-CPA security of Π.
Game 5. As in Game 4, but we restore the prover PH to compute proofs. This is indistin-
guishable by the unbounded zero-knowledge property of the proof system.
Game 6. Game 6 differs from the previous one in that the decryption oracle restart to invoke
Dec(sk i, ·) on input the first ciphertext c. This is indistinguishable due to the soundness
of the proof system.
Note that this is exactly the experiment KDM-CCA in the case b = 1.
Denote by Si the adversary success in Game i, for i = 0, 1, . . . , 6. Observe that |Prob[S0] −
Prob[S6]| bounds the advantage of a KDM-CCA adversary attacking the scheme Π∗. As in the
proof of Theorem 5, the difference |Prob[Si]−Prob[Si+1]| is negligible for all i = 1, . . . 5, which
makes negligible the advantage of a KDM-CCA adversary against the scheme Π∗. The only
difference here is in the scheme Π, that is KDM-CPA secure instead of simply CPA-secure. In
fact, the combined encryption scheme Π∗ inherits KDM-security just from the scheme Π (when
we move from Game 3 to Game 4).
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